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The Case for Physician Direction in
Health Plans
Edward Hirshfeld*
INTRODUCTION
Market trends have dramatically altered the dynamics of
traditional health care relationships. Advanced forms of man-
aged care organizations (AMCOs), a such as large group and
staff-model health maintenance organizations (HMOs), precipi-
tated this shift. These organizations have significantly changed
the relationships among health plans,2 beneficiaries of health
plans, and physicians.3 Specifically, AMCOs shift the power
over medical decision making from patients and their physicians
to the AMCO managers.4
AMCOs use this shift in power to reduce costs through inten-
sive management of the health care rendered by multiple health
care providers. By moving the medical management of patients
away from physicians and patients to organized health care de-
livery systems, AMCOs introduced a new element into the med-
ical management of patients: while traditionally physicians
focused only on the needs of the patient, they must now also
consider the effect their decisions will have on the financial via-
* Mr. Hirshfeld received his Bachelor of Arts in 1972 from Harvard University,
and his Juris Doctor and Master of Business Administration in 1976 from Cornell
University. He left his position as a partner of Gardner, Carton & Douglas in 1988 to
become vice president and associate general counsel at the American Medical Associ-
ation, where he practices health law.
1. "AMCO" is not an acronym used in the health care market. It is used in this
article for ease of expression. There is a lack of common nomenclature that accu-
rately describes the various organizations that are being assembled. What are called
AMCOs in this article may be referred to as "vertically integrated managed care
plans," "advanced integrated health plans," or something else. All of these names are
used to refer to large group or staff model HMOs that have enough beneficiaries to
justify the creation of a health care delivery network that is dedicated to the care of
the HMO beneficiaries.
2. In this article, the term "health plan" refers to any kind of health care insurance
plan or prepaid health care plan.
3. See Alan L. Hillman, Managing the Physician: Rule Versus Incentives, HEALTH
AFF., Winter 1991, at 138 (discussing the impact managed care has had on traditional
roles in medicine).
4. See id. at 138-39.
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bility of the managed care organization, continuously improving
the overall "value" 5 of the care provided.
Some AMCOs have been able to significantly reduce costs
while maintaining a high level of quality,6 successes noted by
private payers and government policymakers. Thus, more
AMCOs are being developed.7 Many health care economists
believe that these AMCOs have such a compelling economic ad-
vantage over other health plans, including other "managed
care"8 organizations (MCOs), 9 that they will soon become the
prevailing type of health plan in the United States, with only a
5. The term "value" generally refers to the results achieved for the resources ex-
pended, or "a fair return in goods, services, or money .. " WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2531 (1986). Maximizing the value of health care serv-
ices can be defined as the process of 1) maximizing quality and 2) maximizing patient
service while 3) minimizing per patient cost per year. DAVID E. VOGEL, THE PHYSI-
CIAN AND MANAGED CARE 3 (1993).
6. See generally Parker Hannifin's Health Benefits Program: Self-Management, 1
MANAGED CARE Q., Autumn 1993, at 1 (evaluating several managed care initiatives
and their successes); Gerald L. McManis & Jerrie A. Stewart, Hospital-Physician Alli-
ances: Building an Integrated Medical Delivery System, HEALTHCARE EXEC., Mar.-
Apr. 1992, at 18 (commenting on the effectiveness of managed care methods of health
care delivery).
7. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CBO STAFF MEMORANDUM: THE EFFECTS
OF MANAGED CARE ON USE AND COSTS OF HEALTH SERVICES 5-22 (June 1992).
8. The term "managed care" refers to a broad spectrum of activities. Various defi-
nitions have been developed, but no single definition exists. The American Medical
Association (AMA) defines managed care as "systems or techniques that are used to
affect access to and control payment for health care services." DEPARTMENT OF MED-
ICAL REVIEW, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MANAGED
CARE-A SUMMARY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION POLICY 1 (1993). The
AMA further specifies that
[m]anaged care techniques most often include one or more of the following:
prior, concurrent, and retrospective review of the medical necessity and ap-
propriateness of services and/or site of services; contracts with selected
health care professionals or providers; financial incentives or disincentives
related to the use of specific providers, services, or service sites; controlled
access to and coordination of services by a case manager; and payer efforts
to identify treatment alternatives and modify benefit restrictions for high-
cost patients (i.e., high-cost case management).
Id.
9. For purposes of this article, the terms "managed care organizations" (MCOs)
or "managed care plans" are used to refer to the entire spectrum of health insurance
plans or prepaid medical care plans that use managed care techniques, including tradi-
tional indemnity health insurance plans that use managed care techniques such as
"utilization review." MCO also includes the full spectrum of organizations created to
apply managed care techniques, such as, but not limited to, health maintenance orga-
nizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), exclusive provider orga-
nizations (EPOs), designated provider organizations (DPOs), point of service plans
(POSs), and competitive medical plans (CMPs).
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few large AMCOs providing care for most of the population in
each market area in the country. 10
If AMCOs do achieve this advantage, the result will be an
extraordinary concentration of power over the medical manage-
ment of patients within a few AMCOs in each regional market.
Such tremendous concentration of power over medical manage-
ment is unprecedented in the history of health care. Equally
unprecedented is the ultimate power over medical management
decisions residing in a few managers or executives, most of
whom are likely to be nonphysicians.
This article argues that the shift in power to nonphysician
managers is only acceptable in the highly pluralistic market that
we have today, where patients and providers have many alterna-
tives to AMCOs. However, the shift will be detrimental if a few
large AMCOs controlled by nonphysician managers dominate
the market. That would result in less than optimal performance
by AMCOs, where performance is measured by the overall
"value" achieved. Management by nonphysicians could also re-
sult in the loss of patient-centered values in medical manage-
ment, and could transform the patient-physician relationship
from one of trust, where the physician is the unquestioned advo-
cate of the patient's well-being, into an arm's length business
relationship.
This article also argues that the shift in power should be mod-
erated to enhance the performance of MCOs, especially
AMCOs, and that patient-centered orientation in medical man-
agement along with trust in the physician-patient relationship
should be preserved. This can be accomplished by 1) requiring
all MCOs, or at least AMCOs, to form a medical board elected
by physicians participating in the MCO for the purpose of re-
viewing the plan's medical policy and other issues, and 2) facili-
tate through legislation the formation of MCOs and health care
delivery networks controlled and/or operated by physicians.
10. See Jean Buckner, The Managed Care Marketplace, J. HEALTH CARE MAR-
KETING, Mar. 1990, at 2, 5; Wanda J. Jones & John J. Mayerhofer, Regional Health
Care Systems: Implications for Health Care Reform, MANAGED CARE Q., Winter
1994, at 31; VOGEL, supra note 5, at iv.
1994]
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I. THE GROWTH OF MANAGED CARE
The health care industry is rapidly converting from the use of
traditional indemnity health insurance plans to MCOs."1 In
1991, only about 10 to 15 percent of Americans were benefi-
ciaries of traditional health insurance plans. In contrast, 90 per-
cent of Americans were part of traditional plans in the early
1970s. 12 The market share of advanced MCOs has grown dra-
matically during the last decade: approximately 15 percent of
the United States' population is enrolled in HMOs, 13 which is
triple the number enrolled in 1980,'4 and 19.5 percent of the
population is enrolled in PPOs. 15
The conversion to managed care is being driven by the cost
crisis in health care. 6 In a traditional health care relationship,
the health plan has no control over expenditures, and the pa-
tient and physician have no incentive to control costs. The phy-
sician's focus is solely on healing patients: any treatment the
physician orders that is within the realm of acceptable medical
practice is a covered expense. The result has been unmanage-
able increases in health care expenditures. 17
The easiest way for the ultimate payers'8 for health care to
control costs would be to substantially reduce or eliminate bene-
fits. If most ultimate payers chose that tactic, there would be
less money available to pay for health care and health plans, and
the demand for both would decline. The resulting reduction in
demand would force most health plans and providers to find
ways to provide health care at lower costs or be forced out of
11. In a traditional indemnity insurance plan, the insurer agrees to pay for all
reasonable and necessary medical services for the treatment of any illness or injury
that is within the plan's defined scope of coverage. The insurer is obligated to pay
claims incurred by the beneficiary regardless of whether the provider has a contrac-
tual relationship with the insurer. See BERTRAM HARNETT & IRVING I. LESNICc, THE
LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE § 6A (1992).
12. See VOGEL, supra note 5, at 9.
13. VOGEL, supra note 5, at 22; AMCRA, 1993-94 MANAGED CARE OVERVIEW
17 (1994). See Marsha R. Gold, HMOs and Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Winter
1991, at 189, 190.
14. VOGEL, supra note 5, at 22; MICHELLE J. PORTER & RICHARD L. HAMER, 2
THE INTERSTUDY COMPETITIVE EDGE 4 (1993).
15. AMCRA, supra note 13, at 21.
16. For a summary of the cost crisis, see Susan M. Browning, Forces for Reforming
the U.S. Health Care System: A Review of the Cost and Access Issues, 1 HEALTH
ECON. 169 (1992).
17. Id. at 171.
18. The term "ultimate payers" in this article refers to employers, unions, profes-
sional associations, government entitlement programs, and other group purchasers of
health care plans.
[Vol. 3
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business. In reality, however, this will not happen because the
moral imperatives associated with health care make solving this
problem with significant cuts in benefits unacceptable. 19 There-
fore, ultimate payers have had to find other ways to motivate
health plans and providers to reduce costs while maintaining
quality.
Managed care is an alternative ultimate payers are trying with
regularity. MCOs attempt to reduce costs and maintain quality
by focusing on the medical management of patients while con-
taining provider payments. Medical management is achieved in
a variety of methods, including: 1) eliminating unnecessary
care, 2) providing needed care more efficiently, and 3) prevent-
ing the need for episodes of acute care. These methods of medi-
cal management tend to reinforce each other and blend
together. The net result of medical management is to reduce the
demand for medical services, but not to eliminate benefits.
Providers, especially physicians, must ultimately employ these
methods of medical management because they are the profes-
sionals that actually care for patients. Large-scale medical man-
agement will not work unless physicians and other providers
alter their practice patterns or practice techniques. An impor-
tant issue has been how best to motivate physicians to engage in
medical management methods.
MCOs motivate physicians to change their practice methods
by changing the way in which they are paid. Provider payment
is contained by 1) discounts from usual charges or fees,20 2) fee-
withhold arrangements, whereby a percentage of fees or charges
is withheld and paid only if utilization goals are met,21 and 3)
capitation, whereby providers are paid a set amount per patient
for a period of time, and are expected to provide all necessary
services (as defined in the provider contract) to a specific pa-
tient population.22
While these methods may appear to save money, they will
only reduce long-term health care expenditures when used in
conjunction with methods of medical management. For exam-
ple, while provider payment controls provide incentives for
19. John C. Gaffney et al., Proposals to Reform the US. Health Care System: A
Critical Review, 1 HEALTH ECON. 181, 183-184 (1992).
20. Peter S. Kongstvedt, Compensation of Primary Care Physicians in Open
Panels, in THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 55, 65 (Peter S. Kongstvedt ed.,
1993).
21. Id. at 58.
22. Id. at 55.
1994]
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providers to reduce costs, especially the volume and intensity23
of medical services, actually reducing the volume and intensity
of medical services provided constitutes medical management.
Also, capitation fees encourage providers to find ways to con-
serve resources without compromising quality-another form of
medical management.
Different kinds of MCOs combine the elements of medical
management and payment arrangements in different ways.
Some have been successful at reducing costs, while others actu-
ally cost more than traditional indemnity plans.2 4 AMCOs, in-
cluding PPOs and HMOs, are more effective than other
managed care plans at reducing costs because they engage in the
most comprehensive medical management of patients. The
methods that they employ require a high degree of coordination
between the practices of physicians and the practices of other
providers. Most AMCOs have been group or staff-model
HMOs.
Who will be the individuals that control AMCOs and, there-
fore, control medical decision making within the AMCO? Will
they be physicians or persons with other backgrounds? The an-
swer lies in how the AMCOs evolve in a particular market. If
present patterns continue into the future, insurance companies
are likely to dominate, followed by hospitals, and then large
group practices of physicians. Independent physicians with solo
practices, a single partner, or in a small group practice will prob-
ably become part of the health care delivery network of an
AMCO or health care delivery network organized by an
AMCO, or they will stop practicing.
23. The term "intensity of services" refers to the degree of resources focused on a
patient to resolve a medical problem. Cardiac bypass surgery has a high level of in-
tensity for the resolution of heart disease, angioplasty has a lower level of intensity for
the same problem, anticoagulant drugs a still lower level, and prevention of heart
disease through screening and risk factor management the lowest of all.
24. See generally Donald W. Moran & Patrice R. Wolfe, Can Managed Care Con-
trol Costs?, HEALTH AF., Winter 1991, at 120 (commenting on the range of successes
within MCOs).
25. See Verdon S. Staines, Potential Impact of Managed Care on National Health
Spending, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 248 (outlining the cost savings generated by
such plans).
[Vol. 3
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II. CONTROL OF THE AMCOs
A. Market Dynamics
The way in which AMCOs evolve in regional markets tends to
favor insurance companies, hospitals, and large groups, to the
disadvantage of the independent physicians. Health care mar-
kets generally do not become dominated by AMCOs overnight.
Instead, AMCOs evolve over a period of years because the es-
tablishment of an AMCO meets resistance primarily from bene-
ficiaries but also from physicians. Patients are accustomed to
selecting providers and having some control in making medical
decisions. They resist health plans that will restrict their choice
and control.2 6 Since most individuals with health plans obtain
them through their employers, and employees see the imple-
mentation of an AMCO as a reduction in their benefits, employ-
ers are often reluctant to implement a managed care program. 7
Providers on the other hand resent their loss of professional and
economic autonomy. In addition, the widespread introduction
of AMCOs may make solo and small group practice economi-
cally infeasible,28 ending a way of life among physicians that is
centuries old. Finally, health care delivery networks are com-
plex to organize and efficiently operate, requiring provider ex-
perience of how to make it function well. The experience
necessary takes time to obtain, resulting in a lack of networks
needed for intensive medical management.
Because of these obstacles, managed care generally evolves in
a market in steps, beginning with the least advanced managed
care plans, then moving in sequence through the more advanced
plans, and finally to AMCOs.
Phase One. The first phase of managed care is the implemen-
tation of utilization review techniques and case management by
traditional indemnity plans. These techniques are initiated by
insurance companies, which start to gain experience in medical
management. Beneficiaries and providers are often disturbed
by the use of these techniques, viewing them as an infringement
on their control over medical decision making.
26. See, e.g., Joseph L. Angeletti, Clinton Plan Would Have Crippled Me, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 18, 1994, at A10 (author argues that under the Clinton plan, his rare
disease would not have been treated).
27. See, e.g., id.
28. See Jeanne Kassler, Managed Care-or Chaos: Profile of Health Maintenance
Organizations, N.Y. MAG., Aug. 23, 1993, at 44.
1994]
7
Hirshfeld: The Case for Physician Direction in Health Plans
Published by LAW eCommons, 1994
Annals of Health Law
Also, small staff-model HMOs may be available in the market
because employers are required to offer them under the Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973. However, they gener-
ally do not have enough beneficiaries to justify employing more
than a few primary care physicians and must contract with in-
dependent physician specialists and hospitals for care that their
primary care physicians cannot handle. While these HMOs are
usually priced at a low level, the savings is not enough to entice
beneficiaries to switch given their concerns about loss of free-
dom of choice.
Independent provider association (IPA) model HMOs may
also be available in the market, but they generally have a limited
number of beneficiaries and, in practice, are structured much
like a preferred provider organization (PPO). Patients must see
IPA-member physicians as a condition of coverage. However,
there might not be a gatekeeper physician, and since most physi-
cians in the market will be IPA members, patients will have a
wide choice of providers. The IPA members are paid on a fee-
for-service basis, and savings are gained by attempting to reduce
hospital charges and admissions. Because these HMOs offer a
wide range of choice, they tend to gain market share more
quickly than staff-model HMOs.
Phase Two. A second phase of managed care will come about
when continued pressure to reduce costs causes employers and
insurers to cooperate in the formation of PPOs. Employers will
offer more complete subsidies to employees who choose the
PPO over the indemnity plan traditionally offered by the em-
ployer. The PPO uses the volume obtained to negotiate fee dis-
counts with the providers, and uses financial incentives to
encourage patients to use the physicians in the PPO panel. A
large percentage of physicians is recruited to become part of the
approved panel from which beneficiaries can obtain care, reduc-
ing concerns over a loss of freedom of choice. This wide choice
and lower price allows them to gain market share more quickly
than the HMOs.
During this phase, the HMOs may make more aggressive use
of financial incentives to reduce costs. They will ask physicians
to agree to fee-withhold arrangements or capitation, and ask
hospitals to accept a fixed rate per day regardless of the services
used by the patient (per diems). In addition, HMOs become
more aggressive about medical management, implementing
gatekeeper systems and utilization review, and contracting more
[Vol. 3
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selectively with providers. Although PPOs may grow more
quickly than HMOs, the HMOs continue to gain market share.
Phase Three. The stage is now set for a third phase, with in-
creased PPO market share, reduced hospital and physician
charges, and rigorous use of utilization review techniques. To
continue to reduce costs, PPOs begin to monitor the resource
usage of the providers on their panels, and terminate physicians
and hospitals who use more resources per patient than average,
or who use more resources than a predetermined or predicted
level.29
HMOs have become equally aggressive about reducing costs.
Medical management in general starts to become more intense
and large group practices become interested in contracting with
HMOs. Experience with PPOs encourages more beneficiaries
to switch to HMOs, providing the HMOs with the critical mass
necessary to encompass enough providers to coordinate care on
a larger scale.
At this point, insurers see the need to have health care deliv-
ery networks to remain competitive in the market, providers be-
come less concerned about the incursions of managed care on
their autonomy and more concerned about survival, and the
PPOs' trademarks-provider deselection, lower fees, and in-
creased medical management-encourage physicians and other
providers to form their own health care delivery networks or
MCOs. While insurers, hospitals, and large physician multis-
peciality practices are in a good position to form AMCOs,30 in-
dependent physicians in solo practice or small groups must start
from scratch to create a network.
Phase Four. During the fourth phase, with managed care be-
ginning to dominate the market, price differentials between in-
demnity plans and HMOs and PPOs become significant, and
beneficiaries become more comfortable with the restrictions of
HMOs and PPOs. Most of the non-Medicare population join a
PPO or HMO and most physicians and hospitals align them-
selves with HMOs, PPOs, or health care delivery networks capa-
ble of contracting with HMOs or PPOs.
29. The techniques for evaluating resource usage are generally crude in that they
do not evaluate why the physicians used more or less resources than the average or
the predicted amount. Deselection Predilection, MEDICAL STAFF AND PHYSICIAN OR-
GANIZATION LEGAL ADVISOR, Mar. 1994, at 1.
30. Some large physician multispecialty practices actually own or are organiza-
tionally affiliated with hospitals such as The Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, the Cleveland
Clinic in Ohio, the Carle Clinic in Illinois, and the Scott & White Clinic in Texas.
1994]
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In addition, as pressure on fee levels grows, providers become
more interested in capitation arrangements or salaries as op-
posed to fee-for-service arrangements. This facilitates the for-
mation of organized health care delivery systems capable of
comprehensive medical management. While not many markets
in the United States have reached this phase, some areas that
have include the Los Angeles-Anaheim-Riverside-San Diego
area in California, the San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose-Sacra-
mento area in California, and the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.3 '
Phase Five. The final phase will occur when most of the non-
Medicare population is in AMCOs. While this has not occurred
in any market yet, the three markets mentioned above are ap-
proaching this phase. In the Los Angeles area market, forty-
seven percent of the insured population is in an HMO, while in
the San Francisco area it has reached fifty-six percent.32
While managed care has been evolving in some Phase Four
markets over the course of decades, it is likely that early-stage
markets will evolve into later stages at a much quicker pace.
Organizers of managed care plans now have the benefit of the
knowledge gained in the development of existing later-stage
markets. In addition, pressures to reduce costs have become
very intense. The evolution will accelerate if state or federal
health care reform legislation is passed that facilitates the devel-
opment of managed care.
B. Physician Control of a Minority of AMCOs and Networks
The market dynamics described above will leave a minority of
AMCOs and health care delivery networks operated by physi-
cians. Although large multispecialty physician group practices
may be well positioned to enter the managed care market, only
about one third of physicians are in group practice. Of this
group, most are in small groups of less than 10 physicians. As of
1991, there were only 189 large group practices with more than
100 physicians, 67 groups with between 75 and 99 physicians,
and 146 groups with between 50 and 75 physicians.33 About one
third of physicians are in solo practice or have a single partner,
another third are in group practices, and the remaining third are
31. See Mike Mitka & Julie Johnsson, Messing with Texas, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr.
4, 1994, at 9.
32. Id.
33. PENNY L. HAVLICEK ET AL., MEDICAL GROUPS IN THE U.S.: A SURVEY OF
PRACTICE CHARACTERISTICS (1993).
[Vol. 3
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in other practice settings, such as medical school faculty, em-
ployees of HMOs, and employees of hospitals.
The structural and legal disadvantages that physicians in in-
dependent practice and small groups face constitute a formida-
ble barrier to the development of physician-sponsored networks
and health plans. Even if independent physicians succeed in or-
ganizing a network, it is likely to face stiff competition. To con-
tract with an insurance company or self-insured employer, the
network must be more competitive than networks that the insur-
ers can organize themselves as well as hospital-organized enti-
ties or large group practices. Given that the competing
organizations are probably already entrenched in the market,
are more experienced and well organized, and have greater fi-
nancial resources, the probability for success is low.
Thus, independent physicians often choose to work with a
hospital to form a physician-hospital health care delivery net-
work. 34 By doing so, physicians gain the benefit of the adminis-
trative infrastructure of the hospital and its financial resources,
but must give up a substantial portion of control to the hospital.
To create a fifty-fifty partnership with the hospital, physicians
need to organize themselves in a separate structure that works
with the hospital. Since the hospital or insurer often assumes
the initiative as well as the organizational burdens, the in-
dependent physicians or small group practices are likely to
forego the hard work and high risks of organizing their own net-
work. Unless this trend changes, AMCOs and their health care
delivery networks are likely to be controlled primarily by insur-
ance companies, secondarily by hospitals, and then by large mul-
tispecialty group practices.
C. Implications of Nonphysician Control of AMCOs
As discussed above, control of AMCOs by nonphysicians
gives nonphysician managers the ultimate authority over medi-
cal decision making, with at least three adverse effects: 1) less
than optimal performance by AMCOs, where performance is
measured by the value achieved, 2) loss of patient-centered val-
ues in the medical management of health plans, and 3) transfor-
mation of the patient-physician relationship from one of trust,
with the physician as the advocate of the patient's well-being,
into an arm's length business relationship.
34. William Madigan, Remarks at the American Medical Association Leadership
Conference (Feb. 11, 1994) (on file with the author).
19941
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Less than optimal patient outcomes will result from the shift
in power because the primary source of savings achieved by
AMCOs comes from medical management .3  The challenge
faced by the health care industry is to determine ways to reduce
costs while continuing to provide high-quality services, thereby
increasing the value of health care. Historically, creative initia-
tives in advances in medical care have come primarily from phy-
sicians and other scientists, not administrators who have no
medical training.36 Physicians continue to be the best qualified
to make medical decisions that maximize the value of health
care services 37 and embrace and resolve the challenge of finding
ways to reduce costs without sacrificing coverage or quality. If
this challenge is taken away from physicians by having nonphy-
sician managers direct them, the creative initiative of physicians
will be muted.38
Second, the shift of power will result in the loss of patient-
centered values in medical treatment. Nonphysician managers
are remote from the patients and, more important, their job is to
maintain the financial viability of the enterprise. The fiduciary
duty of the nonphysician manager is to act in the best interest of
the enterprise, which can conflict with patient needs. Their cus-
toms and values are oriented around that duty, and thus they
will not focus on patient-centered ways to manage medical care
to reduce costs. Historically, bars on the corporate practice of
medicine prevented the orientation of corporate managers from
affecting the needs of patients. While those bars are being elim-
inated in most states, no legal or ethical theory of the corpora-
35. David Blumenthal, Commentary: The Vital Role of Professionalism in Health
Care Reform, HEALTH AFF., Spring (1) 1994, at 252, 253.
36. In fact, many of the individuals who pioneered the conceptual thought and
research underlying the medical management in AMCOs were physicians. See, e.g.,
Paul M. Ellwood et al., The Jackson Hole Initiatives for a Twenty-First Century Ameri-
can Health Care System, 1 HEALTH ECON. 149 (1992). Physicians also led the way in
performing research that demonstrated that different incentives and better medical
management could result in savings by reducing the amount of unnecessary care. See
Richard Kronick et al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform: The Demographic
Limitations of Managed Care, 328 N. ENG. J. MED. 148, 149 (1993).
37. Joseph White, Markets, Budgets, and Health Care Cost Control, HEALTH AFF.,
Fall 1993, at 44, 53; Blumenthal, supra note 35, at 253.
38. This is not meant to degrade the very significant contributions made to the
formation of successful AMCOs by nonphysician professionals. However, their chief
contribution has been to establish economic incentives and organizational structures
to motive health plans, physicians, and beneficiaries to maximize the value of health
care services. Nonphysicians have also helped design administrative structures and
information systems needed for AMCOs to function.
[Vol. 3
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tion as the provider has emerged to guide the behavior of
corporate managers of health plans.
Anecdotal incidents suggest that insurance company manag-
ers tend to rely on formulas or standards to determine whether
medical care is needed or to evaluate the performance of prov-
iders. The goal of these formulas is often to scale back the
amount of care given by the provider for a given condition.
These formulas and standards are crude tools, applied without
consideration of the unique circumstances of the patients being
treated by the provider.39
For example, a Rhode Island insurer recently promulgated
guidelines for hospitalization periods that it expects its partici-
pating physicians to follow, with the goal of reducing costs by
cutting the number of days the patients spend in the hospital. 40
Also, some HMOs have stopped providing epidural anesthetics
for births deemed to be healthy.41 In Texas, an insurer is
deselecting physicians based on whether they fall within cost
levels predicted for them by a formula. If a physician exceeds
the predicted cost, the physician is deselected without any in-
quiry into why the formula was exceeded.42
To the contrary, an example of a patient-centered way to re-
duce costs is to keep patients healthy (preventive care) so that
they do not need expensive health care (aggressive treatment of
a health care problem caused by inadequate preventive care).
Finally, it is inevitable that the shift in power will denigrate
the patient's trust in the physician because the physician will no
longer be economically independent. The physician will become
the agent of the AMCO, economically dependent on the
AMCO, and taking direction from the AMCO managers. There
39. Again, this is not meant to denigrate the contributions of nonphysician manag-
ers, nor does it seek to portray them as inhumane or unconcerned about patients. It
simply points out the fundamental realities of the legal and practical constraints that
these individuals are obligated to operate within, and the consequences those con-
straints are likely to have on their decisions: the manager owes a fiduciary responsi-
bility to the corporation or the enterprise, while the physician owes a fiduciary
obligation to the patient.
40. Greg Borzo, R.I. Doctors Face 'Absurd' Inpatient Limits, AM. MED. NEWS,
Mar. 21, 1994, at 1.
41. Danielle Crittenden, Don't Give Birth Up Here, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1994, at
A14 (noting that just as a woman in Canada was unable to receive an epidural be-
cause it was not "her turn," some large HMOs refuse to pay for epidurals in Califor-
nia, the Midwest, and Florida).
42. In one case, a physician who was named the insurer's physician of the month
was deselected due to this formula several months after being given the award.
Deselection Predilection, supra note 29.
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will be no independent patient-physician contract. Physicians
will make treatment recommendations to patients based on the
protocols and limitations established by the AMCO, regardless
of whether the physician believes that the called-for protocol is
the best alternative for the patient. A physician who is in-
dependent of such a health plan feels free to inform the patient
of other alternatives and to advocate for those alternatives,
while a physician controlled and directed by an AMCO will not
feel this freedom.43
Numerous individuals, including medical ethicists, physicians,
and legal scholars, have questioned the potentially damaging ef-
fects of the shift in power over medical decision making to man-
aged care organizations. However, because the perceived
savings from converting the health care industry to AMCOs are
so great, most government and private-sector policymakers are
preoccupied with facilitating the conversion, and have given lit-
tle serious thought to these effects. In fact, the possibility of
having a small number of AMCOs serving most of the patients
in a market is viewed as positive because it could increase the
competition between efficient competitors and spur them to find
even more ways to reduce costs.
To the extent that the issue of control over medical decision
making is raised, removing control from physicians tends to be
viewed as positive or of no real concern for three reasons. First,
one of the tools that is expected to be available to purchasers of
managed care in the near future is information about the quality
of care delivered by AMCOs. This information would be based
on outcome data, and the outcomes of each plan could be com-
pared against performance standards and the outcomes of other
AMCOs. Policymakers expect that purchasers will then be able
to select the plan that offers the best value (the best combina-
tion of cost and quality). The assumption is that regardless of
who makes medical decisions, AMCOs will have to maintain a
high level of quality in order to remain competitive.
The use of outcome data and increased levels of information
will help assure high performance by the AMCOs, revealing
abuses such as arbitrarily withholding health care in order to
43. Advocates of AMCOs recognize this problem but believe that it can be re-
solved by standardizing information about quality, requiring health plans to report
that information, and enabling patients to use that information to select a health plan.
Although such a process, if successfully achieved, will benefit patients, it will not re-
place patient concerns about individual encounters.
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meet budgetary goals. Outcome data will also provide AMCOs
with an incentive to improve their performance, and will enable
them to monitor their own progress in achieving a better value.
However, outcome data do not address the issue of how greater
value is achieved; they simply show where matters stand. A pro-
fessional group must evaluate the data and determine how out-
comes can be improved while maintaining or reducing costs;
nonphysicians are not capable of doing this as well as physicians,
and well-motivated physicians must have responsibility and con-
trol over this process to assure the data and other medical infor-
mation is used to attain higher levels of performance.
The second argument in favor of the shift in power over medi-
cal decision making is based on the view that physicians are the
primary culprits of high health care costs. 44 Physicians are per-
ceived as having a financial interest in providing high-cost care,
and as being unwilling to adopt a lower-cost practice, even if
that lower-cost style results in a higher quality of care.
While health care costs have been increasing at an unsustain-
able rate under a system of physician-directed health care deci-
sion making, cost increases are attributable to a number of
causes beyond the scope of physician control.45 Physicians' deci-
sions contributed to the cost crisis largely because physicians op-
erate with an ethical framework that emphasizes providing
every beneficial mode of patient treatment, a malpractice envi-
ronment that buttresses that ethic, and a financing system that
provides no incentives to find ways to conserve resources while
pursuing that ethic.
The current challenge is to maintain the ethic of making the
health care needs of the individual patient the highest priority,
while finding ways to accomplish that at a lower cost. The belief
that physicians are incapable of meeting this challenge or too
self-interested to care is cynical and simply wrong. Through the
centuries, the medical profession has implemented significant
changes and is capable of doing so today. In fact, the process is
well under way, and is following a pattern that usually occurs
when the profession transforms itself: the realization by some
physicians that change is necessary and their proposed solutions.
While change is usually controversial and humans often resist
44. See Joseph P. Newhouse, An Iconoclastic View of Health Cost Containment,
HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 152; Walter A. Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clin-
ton Health Reform Plan, HEALTH AFF., Spring (I) 1994, at 9.
45. Browning, supra note 16, at 170-73.
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changing the status quo, intense debate within medical societies,
academia, and other forums reveal the merit of change, and the
medical profession gradually embraces the concept that change
is needed and then vigorously pursues a solution. Some of the
major changes that were implemented according to this pattern
are the nineteenth-century effort to distinguish scientifically
based allopathic medicine from numerous other theories; the
nineteenth-century effort to develop a system of physician licen-
sure; the twentieth-century effort to establish accreditation stan-
dards for medical schools and graduate medical education; and
the twentieth-century effort to develop specialties and methods
for certifying physicians as specialists.
The need to control health care costs has caused physicians to
take the lead in reassessing the value of medical care. Physi-
cians performed the research that revealed that significant
amounts of medical care provided to patients may not be yield-
ing benefits. In addition, physician organizations are assessing
various aspects of medical care and developing practice parame-
ters to assist physicians in determining what care should be pro-
vided. At the present time, virtually every national medical
specialty society is in the process of developing practice parame-
ters. Although the current changes in medical practice are con-
troversial, the medical profession will adopt them if they in fact
prove to be more effective than current methods.
Finally, an argument for the shift in power is based on wide-
spread agreement among health care economists that some arbi-
trary limits on the provision of health care are necessary and
inevitable4 because it is not economically feasible to provide all
beneficial health care to all people, especially considering the
advancement of technology. Many health care economists be-
lieve that even if every cause of medical inflation were resolved
except the introduction of new technology, advances in
medicine alone would continue to fuel unsustainable increases
health care costs. This is so because health care is not a single
product, but rather a cluster or portfolio of products constantly
increasing as a result of new technology-products that can be
purchased to help patients that could not be helped before. The
logical extension of this belief is that some rationing of care, or
46. See William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-Containment
Strategies: Why They Can Provide Only Temporary Relief, 257 JAMA 220 (1987);
Henry Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice Before Us,
247 SCIENCE 418 (1990).
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at the very least some control of new technology, will be neces-
sary in the future. From this perspective, concentration of
power over medical decision making in the AMCO is an accept-
able way of accomplishing rationing or limiting new technology,
and gives the government a convenient tool for implementing a
rationing program.
However, before rationing takes hold, every effort should be
made to see if the patient-centered ethic of physicians and soci-
ety can be preserved. Physicians should be given the responsi-
bility and incentives to find ways to provide needed care. Even
if rationing new technology or the coverage of medical services
becomes necessary, it can be accomplished without taking medi-
cal decision making away from physicians.
III. THE SOLUTION TO THE GREAT CONCENTRATION OF
POWER IN AMCO NONPHYSICIAN MANAGEMENT
The problems caused by the concentration of power over
medical decision making can be ameliorated in two ways. First,
AMCOs could establish medical boards composed of physicians,
at least fifty percent of whom participate in the AMCO. (At the
present time there is no vehicle for physicians participating in an
MCO to provide input into the plan about medical management
and economic issues.) The medical board of each MCO would
have the authority to periodically review the AMCO's medical
coverage, quality assurance and efficiency, and credentialing op-
erations. These boards could be established on a voluntary basis
by AMCOs or could be required by legislation. Second, legisla-
tion could be passed that facilitates the development of physi-
cian-sponsored health care delivery networks and health plans
by establishing structural criteria, changing legal regulations that
interfere with their structure and operation, and providing tax
preferences and other financial assistance.
A. Medical Boards
At first blush, the proposal that advanced HMOs form medi-
cal boards appears to be very radical. Fundamentally, however,
this is not a new idea and not radical at all-historical precedent
shows that this concept has been applied before in the develop-
ment of new institutions that had the potential to exert tremen-
dous control over medical decision making. To the contrary, the
truly radical concept is the formation of AMCOs that may ob-
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tain an extraordinary concentration of power over medical deci-
sion making without any formal structures for physician input.
The historical precedent is the development of the modem
hospital. As recently as the nineteenth century, the hospital was
not an important tool in medical practice. It functioned more as
a nursing home for the poor and a resource for public health
calamities, such as epidemics or large numbers of injuries caused
by natural disasters or war. However, as medical technology
and organization advanced, the hospital became an increasingly
important place for treatment because it had the necessary facil-
ities, equipment, and support personnel that even large groups
of physicians could not afford to duplicate in their offices.47
Like AMCOs, hospitals developed a legal structure that had
the potential to remove the ultimate power over medical deci-
sion making from patients and physicians and give it to nonphy-
sicians, as most were organized as corporations with a
management structure and a governing board controlled by phi-
lanthropists and other leading citizens. As the operation of hos-
pitals became more complex, they were managed by
nonphysician, professional administrators.
When the organizational structure of the modern hospital was
developed in the early twentieth century, there were concerns
over the control of medical decision making in the hospital.
This concern was resolved by requiring hospitals to have a sepa-
rate, organized medical staff responsible for medical manage-
ment in the hospital. This requirement, established in 1919 by
the founders of the hospital accreditation program,48 is currently
a part of the standards for hospital accreditation of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and
of the statutory or regulatory conditions of hospital licensure in
virtually every state.49
The hospital medical staff does not have complete control
over the provision of care within the hospital as corporate law
requires that the ultimate responsible for the quality of care pro-
47. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE (1982) (discussing the historic development of hospitals and medical
organizations).
48. Everett A. Johnson, Ethical Considerations for Business Relationships of Hos-
pitals and Physicians, HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV., Summer 1991, at 7, 9.
49. In addition, most states have a common law or statutory bar on the corporate
practice of medicine that is meant to prevent nonphysicians from exercising control
over medical decision making. These laws have become dormant in most states, but
are still enforced in California, Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, and Texas.
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vided on hospital premises remain with the hospital governing
board. However, the governing board delegates the responsibil-
ity for medical management to the medical staff, the very vehi-
cle by which hospital physicians present their views to the
hospital governing board.
If, as this article proposes, all AMCOs were required to have
medical boards, their organization would be similar in nature to
the hospital organization, but less elaborate. The medical board
of each AMCO would be responsible for reviewing the opera-
tional areas of the health plan involving medical decision mak-
ing and making recommendations to management and the
governing board about what and how decisions should be made.
While management and the governing board would not be obli-
gated to accept or implement the medical board's recommenda-
tions, they would be required to consider them in good faith.
The goal is to provide an organized vehicle that allows the physi-
cians who actually care for plans' beneficiaries to have some in-
put in medical management decisions. Physician input will help
minimize the adverse effects of nonphysician managers' concen-
trated power over medical decision making.
Allowing physicians to have this voice is likely to increase the
AMCOs' performance: participating physicians can become di-
rectly involved in evaluating and recommending ways to reduce
costs while maintaining quality, thereby enhancing their level of
commitment and motivation. Involvement also allows physi-
cians to express patient-centered values during the process of
reducing costs. By permitting physicians to continue in their
traditional role as patient advocates, a valuable part of the phy-
sician-patient relationship is preserved.
B. Legislation to Facilitate the Development of Physician-
Directed Health Care Delivery Networks and Health
Plans
Another obvious solution to the problems caused by the con-
centration of power over medical decision making with nonphy-
sicians is to enact legislation that facilitates the development of
physician-controlled health care delivery networks and health
plans. AMCO performance can be maximized by giving physi-
cians the maximum incentive to embrace the challenge of find-
ing ways to reduce costs while enhancing quality. Physicians will
be most motivated if they own and operate the MCOs or the
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health care delivery network and are responsible for managing
the premium or capitation income.
This is not a new idea. Again, history supports resolving a
health care crisis in America by passing legislation to facilitate
the formation of provider-sponsored health plans and provider-
sponsored health care delivery networks. Two legislative solu-
tions proposed this century were very successful.
The first was state legislation promoting the development of
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, which were to be sponsored
by providers-Blue Cross plans by hospitals and Blue Shield
plans by physicians. Before 1929, efforts to cover hospitaliza-
tion expenses and/or provide for medical care were isolated,
providing, at best, income replacement during illness. ° In 1929,
Baylor University offered the first hospital insurance coverage,
guaranteeing twenty-one days of hospital care for six dollars per
year. World War II brought additional pressures for health care
coverage when wage freezes forced labor leaders to push for
other benefits, including medical care.51 Under the hospital cov-
erage plans established in the early 1930s, beneficiaries con-
tracted with a specific hospital for care; later, when attempts
were made to offer a choice of hospitals within any given com-
munity, state insurance commissioners who viewed Baylor-type
plans as group contracts wanted to subject free-choice plans,
viewed as insurance, to state regulation. 2
In response to this regulatory problem, states enacted specific
legislation exempting hospitalization (Blue Cross) and medical
services (Blue Shield) plans from state insurance regulations.
These unique organizations solved the health care crisis existing
at that time, 3 and were extraordinarily successful. In many
states, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations were spon-
sored by hospital associations and medical societies, respec-
tively. Today, they are large, sophisticated organizations, in
many states the largest operators of health plans and administra-
50. ROBERT D. EILERS, REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS
9 (1963).
51. Id. at 19.
52. SYLVIA A. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG 7 (1974).
53. Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans differ from commercial insurance plans in
several respects: 1) plans are nonprofit and include members of the public on the
governing boards, 2) plans operate autonomously at the community level, and 3) rate
or benefits changes must be approved in advance by state insurance regulators. BLUE
CROSS BLUE SHIELD ASSOCIATION, FACT BOOK: ALL ABOUT THE BLUE CROSS AND
BLUE SHIELD ORGANIZATION 3 (1994).
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tive services for self-insured plans, and in many regions the car-
rier and intermediary for the Medicare program.
The second piece of legislation addressing a health care crisis
was the federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973
(HMO Act),54 which specifically 'authorized the IPA-model
HMO and generally facilitated the development of HMOs. Be-
tween 1960 and 1971, national health expenditures increased by
188 percent. A Senate Report noted: "There is substantial evi-
dence which establishes that HMO enrollees receive high qual-
ity care at a lower cost-as much as one-fourth to one-third
lower than traditional care in some parts of this country.
55
President Richard Nixon endorsed the concept of HMOs and
federal involvement in their development in order to reduce
health care costs, encourage preventive care, foster early treat-
ment, and increase the number of physicians and outpatient fa-
cilities in the inner city and rural areas. 6
The HMO Act preempts state law regarding formation and
governance of these organizations. In particular, the HMO Act
lists the services to be provided by HMOs to enrollees and re-
quires employers with health benefit plans to offer HMOs to
their employees if HMOs are available in the area. The HMO
Act was very successful: it provided a blueprint for the creation
of HMOs, regulations for HMOs, and requirements and assist-
ance that helped form them.
Legislation to facilitate the formation of physician-sponsored
health care delivery networks and health plans could follow the
same general pattern as the Blue Cross and Blue Shield statutes
and the federal HMO Act, and be equally as successful.
First, the legislation should define and authorize the forma-
tion of networks and health plans sponsored by physicians and
controlled by physicians that participate in the network, a health
plan sponsored by physicians and controlled. by participating
physicians, and a joint venture health plan between a physician-
sponsored network and an insurer, hospital, or other institution
where the network physicians have substantial influence or con-
trol over the joint venture.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1988).
55. S. REP. No. 129, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3033, 3033-34.
56. Id. at 3034.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9.
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Second, the legislation must provide a separate regulatory
structure for the networks and plans, preempting, for example,
state insurance regulations, antitrust laws, and bars on self-refer-
ral. This structure must protect the public while not creating
unreasonable barriers to the creation of these network or plans.
Finally, tax preferences and other financial and technical
assistance must be provided: investment credits or deductions
for funds invested in the components of these entities, such as
computer hardware and software needed to provide the medical
information necessary to support medical management, or
amounts invested in required reserves; low-interest loan pools
available for the formation of health plans; and reserve guaranty
funds to assure purchasers that their health care would be
financed.
CONCLUSION
These are extraordinary times for the health care industry.
The traditional ways of doing business are being challenged as
inadequate to meet the challenges of today. Ironically, the cost
and access crises arise from the very success of traditional ways
of doing business: health care is in such demand that our society
is having difficulty finding ways to pay for it. In the process of
reorganizing the health care industry to solve current problems,
we should not forget the elements that have made American
medicine so successful. In particular, any new ways of financing
and delivering medicine should continue to foster the creativity
and initiative of American physicians and should provide pa-
tients with the confidence that the recommendations of their
physicians constitute the best professional judgement about
what health care services will meet their unique needs. The pro-
posals in this article will not interfere with efforts to provide
high-quality health care at a lower cost and that will preserve
the ingredients that have made American medicine the best in
the world.
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